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Lord Montgomery of Botley 
This case raises issues of clinical judgment and moral integrity that invite analysis of the very 
foundations of medical malpractice law. Medicine is a calling that requires the application of 
knowledge but also the exercise of both skill and judgement. Doctors must be scientists applying 
their expertise in the interests of their patients. They also embody an ethical tradition that has been 
developed over centuries and thus must possess moral integrity. It is on the combination of this 
scientific expertise and ethical orientation that the social contract is built that offers the medical 
profession a privileged position in our society in return for the care that it provides. 
These privileges manifest themselves in the law in many ways. Doctors are entrusted with the power 
to dispense with the usual criminal sanctions that relate to the use of powerful drugs; prescription-
only medicines can be deployed only under medical authorisation (and in limited cases that of other 
health professionals such as midwives). The law has accepted that even the law of murder needs to 
be able to accommodate the challenges of medical practice at the extremes of life, acknowledging 
that it cannot be acceptable that following proper professional practice should place doctors at risk 
of prosecution (see R v Adams [1957] and R v Arthur (1981)). That most difficult question of 
determining whether someone is dead or alive has been entrusted by English law to the medical 
profession; both Parliament (Human Tissue Act 1961, s1(4), (4A)) and the courts (Re A [1992] 3 Med 
LR 303) have endorsed the application of the tests developed by that profession. 
These are privileges that bring great responsibility. There has been much criticism of the law of 
negligence for its apparent lenience to doctors. It is true that, in the leading case of Sidaway, Lord 
Scarman raised concerns that the test for the standard of care might abrogate the responsibility of 
the law; ‘The implications of this view of the law are disturbing. It leaves the determination of a legal 
duty to the judgment of doctors’ [1985] 1 All ER 643, 649. Yet, that great judge applied the very 
same test of negligence on behalf of the House of Lords in Maynard v West Midlands AHA [1985] 1 
All ER 635.  
The Bolam test was formulated by McNair J in the following terms 
[A doctor] is not guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance with the practice accepted 
as proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in that particular art. [1957] 1 All ER 
118, 121. 
It is beyond any serious contention that the Bolam test provides the sound foundation of clinical 
negligence. This House made that clear in Whitehouse v Jordan [1981] 1 All ER 267 when considering 
whether care was negligent. Indeed, this House has endorsed the use of the same test in every case 
that has come before it concerning the exercise of medical professional judgement. In Sidaway, it 
was applied to determine the scope of doctors’ duties to volunteer information to their patients. In 
Maynard, it was applied to professional judgment as to the appropriate management of risk. In 
Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 1 FLR it was used to define the extent of the obligations of doctors 
to sustain life. In re F [1989] 2 FLR 376 it was used to determine the liability of doctors when treating 
incapacitated patients.  It would take a very bold judge to reach the conclusion that such an august 
House could be so consistently misguided in its acceptance of the Bolam test. 
Their Lordships reasoning in re F provides an important guide to the rationale behind English law’s 
approach to the regulation of medicine. They were presented with a situation in which it was 
suggested that two fundamental values were in tension; the right to physical integrity (protected by 
the legal doctrines of assault and battery, with the doctor’s liability waived by the patient’s consent 
to invasive treatment) and the right to proper care (enforced via actions in negligence for medical 
malpractice).  Lord Bridge reasoned that it would be wrong to place doctors in a position where their 
behaviour would be judged differently depending on the cause of action pleaded by the plaintiff in 
any subsequent case against them.  
It would be intolerable for members of the medical, nursing and other professions devoted 
to the care of the sick that, in caring for those lacking the capacity to consent to treatment, 
they should be put in the dilemma that, if they administer the treatment which they believe 
to be in the patient's best interests, acting with due skill and care, they run the risk of being 
held guilty of trespass to the person, but, if they withhold that treatment, they may be in 
breach of a duty of care owed to the patient. If those who undertake responsibility for the 
care of incompetent or unconscious patients administer curative or prophylactic treatment 
which they believe to be appropriate to the patient's existing condition of disease, injury or 
bodily malfunction or susceptibility to such a condition in the future, the lawfulness of that 
treatment should be judged by one standard, not two. It follows that if the professionals in 
question have acted with due skill and care, judged by the well-known test laid down in 
Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 2 All ER 118, [1957] 1 WLR 582, 
they should be immune from liability in trespass, just as they are immune from liability in 
negligence. [1989] 2 All ER 545 at 548-9 
There needs to be a single standard, to enable the doctors to be free to deliver the care that the 
patient requires. That standard is captured in the Bolam test. No action for assault or battery can be 
permitted to deter doctors from providing the patient with the care that she needs on the 
tendentious basis that treatment without consent is unlawful.  If it were indeed the law that all 
treatment of an incompetent patient, for whom no one can give a legally valid consent, would be an 
assault, then the interests of such patients would be undermined because barriers would be placed 
in the way of delivering good medicine. 
The most fundamental purpose of the law is to facilitate the delivery of the medical care that 
patients need. The legal duty of a doctor is to apply their professional skills in order to do good for 
their patients, usually described in the bioethical literature as a duty of beneficence. Lord 
Templeman captured this in Sidaway  when he pointed out that the duty to have regard to the 
patient’s best interests overrode any putative obligation inform patients or everything that was 
known about a treatment: 
The objectives, sometimes conflicting, sometimes unattainable, of the doctor's services are 
the prolongation of life, the restoration of the patient to full physical and mental health and 
the alleviation of pain….The doctor, obedient to the high standards set by the medical 
profession impliedly contracts to act at all times in the best interests of the patient…. An 
obligation to give a patient all the information available to the doctor would often be 
inconsistent with the doctor's contractual obligation to have regard to the patient's best 
interests…. The duty of the doctor in these circumstances, subject to his overriding duty to 
have regard to the best interests of the patient, is to provide the patient with information 
which will enable the patient to make a balanced judgment if the patient chooses to make a 
balanced judgment. [1985] 1 All ER 643, 665-6 (emphasis added). 
 
Similar sentiments can be seen in the speech of Lord Diplock, who pointed out that the doctor had a 
‘duty of care to exercise his skill and judgment to improve the patient’s health’ [1985] 1 All ER 643, 
657.  Even Lord Scarman’s speech in Sidaway recognises that where there is a clear clash between 
informing patients and protecting them from harm, then the obligation on doctors to protect their 
patients prevails over the duty to inform them. That is precisely the function of the ‘therapeutic 
privilege’ that he recognises would be required if a reasonable patient test was used to define the 
obligation to disclose information: 
it is plainly right that a doctor may avoid liability for failure to warn of a material risk if he 
can show that he reasonably believed that communication to the patient of the existence of 
the risk would be detrimental to the health (including, of course, the mental health) of his 
patient. [1985] 1 All ER 643, 654. 
It is this facilitative purpose that lies behind the law’s jealous protection of clinical freedom. This has 
sometimes been understood as a principle that serves to insulate doctors from external scrutiny, but 
this is a fundamental misconception of both the workings of the law and its rationale. For clinical 
freedom is not a matter of the absence of external control, but of the promotion of the conditions in 
which medicine can flourish. It is only because these conditions are in place that the law is justified 
in applying more onerous standards to those of a professional calling over and above what could be 
expected of a reasonable traveller on the Clapham Omnibus. 
The defence that an ordinary citizen might make that they did all that could be expected of them 
cannot protect someone of professional standing. In Bolam itself, McNair observed that  
where you get a situation which involves the use of some special skill or competence, then 
the test as to whether there has been negligence or not is not the test of the man on the top 
of a Clapham omnibus, because he has not got this special skill. The test is the standard of 
the ordinary skilled man exercising and professing to have that special skill. [1957] 1 W.L.R. 
582, 586. 
For professionals, it is not enough to meet the standards of an ordinary reasonable person. They 
must meet the extraordinary standards of professional practice. Thus, as Lloyd LJ stated in Gold 
(having quoted the passage just set out), the Bolam test 
extends the duty of care, as the second of the two passages I have quoted from McNair J.'s 
summing up in the Bolam case makes clear. The standard is not that of the man on the top 
of the Clapham omnibus, as in other fields of negligence, but the higher standard of the man 
skilled in the particular profession or calling…. It depends on a man professing skill or 
competence in a field beyond that possessed by the man on the Clapham omnibus [1988] 
Q.B. 481, 489-90. 
As Lord Edmund-Davies pointed out in Whitehouse v Jordan [1981] 1 All ER 267 at 277 by adoption 
of words of the Privy Council in Chin Keow v Government of Malaysia [1967] 1 WLR 813, a 
professional cannot be judged not against the standard of the ‘man on the top of the Clapham 
Omnibus because he has not got this special skill’. 
It would be quite unfair to hold professionals to such standards if the law did not also work to ensure 
that they were in a position to provide the care that their calling requires of them. Thus, in Thake v 
Maurice the court resisted the seductive temptation of an argument that a contractual term could 
warrant success, holding that it was not compatible with the uncertain nature of medical practice. A 
similar point was made about liability in negligence by Lord Denning in the Court of Appeal in 
Whitehouse v Jordan and expressly approved by Lord Fraser in the House of Lords; ‘if they are to be 
found liable whenever they do not effect a cure, or whenever anything untoward happens, it would 
do a great disservice to the profession’ [1980] 1 All ER 650, 658; approved [1981] 1 All ER 267, 281. 
Perhaps the clearest explanation of these issues is that offered by Lord Donaldson of Lymington MR 
in two seminal cases. He explained how clinical imperatives related to legal doctrine, and how the 
latter should serve rather than compromise the former. Consent, he pointed out, has both clinical 
and legal purposes  
The clinical purpose stems from the fact that in many instances the co-operation of the 
patient and the patient's faith or at least confidence in the efficiency of the treatment is a 
major factor contributing to the treatment's success. Failure to obtain such consent will not 
only deprive the patient and the medical staff of this advantage, but will usually make it 
much more difficult to administer the treatment….The legal purpose is quite different. It is 
to provide those concerned in the treatment with a defence to a criminal charge of assault 
or battery or a civil claim for damages for trespass to the person. Re W [1992] 2 FCR 785, 
799-800.  
In Re J, he turned to the role of the doctor in the following terms   
No one can dictate the treatment to be given to any child, neither court, parents nor 
doctors... The doctors can recommend treatment A in preference to treatment B. They can 
also refuse to adopt treatment C on the grounds that it is medically contra‑indicated or for 
some other reason is a treatment which they could not conscientiously administer. The 
court or parents for their part can refuse to consent to treatment A or B or both, but cannot 
insist on treatment C. The inevitable and desirable result is that choice of treatment is in 
some measure a joint decision of the doctors and the court or parents.  Re J [1991] Fam 33, 
41 
It is clear from this formulation that the law protects clinical freedom, in all its scientific and moral 
richness, because it is that which provides the bedrock on which the benefits medicine can give 
patients is built. For the law to require a doctor to treat patients in a way that was inconsistent with 
their clinical judgment or conscience would be a betrayal of the great promise of medicine not its 
fulfilment. As Lord Donaldson put it,  
The fundamental issue in this appeal is whether the court in the exercise of its inherent 
power to protect the interests of minors should ever require a medical practitioner or health 
authority acting by a medical practitioner to adopt a course of treatment which in the bona 
fide clinical judgment of the practitioner concerned is contraindicated as not being in the 
best interests of the patient. I have to say that I cannot at present conceive of any 
circumstances in which this would be other than an abuse of power as directly or indirectly 
requiring the practitioner to act contrary to the fundamental duty which he owes to his 
patient. Re J [1992] 4 All ER 614, 622 
The respect for clinical judgment leads the law to expect the highest standards of integrity from 
members of the medical professional. It is regard to this integrity that prevents due respect 
collapsing into mere deference, something that the law could not permit. This is a case about the 
exercise of professional judgement, but it should always be remembered that judgement is a 
complicated thing to exercise. In part it is about assessment of the factual situation about which the 
professional judgement is to be made. The forensic process must seek first to determine how the 
question appeared to the doctor. Hindsight is a wonderful and seductive thing. It would be unfair to 
judge doctors on the basis of what turned out to be the case, rather than what was apparent to 
them at the time. After all, it is their judgment that is being assessed. There is, however, always a 
risk of self-serving testimony; both claimants and professionals may genuinely or dishonestly believe 
that the facts were as they wished them to be. This is a matter on which it is quite proper for the 
court to settle disputes of fact in the usual way, evaluating the reliability of witness and examining 
the evidence presented. Judgment is also about the application of knowledge. Here, professionals 
can expect respect for their judgments provided they are exercised in good faith and with integrity.  
The facts in the case before the House have been summarised succinctly by my learned friend Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson and need not be repeated here. Suffice it to say that the case turns on two key 
issues about clinical judgments made by Dr Horn. First, we are required to consider whether the 
failure of Dr Horn to attend Patrick (or arrange for someone else to do so) was negligent. Second, we 
must consider whether Dr Horn was entitled to rely on the fact that she would not have intubated 
Patrick had she in fact attended. It is accepted before this court that only intubation would have 
saved Patrick’s life and so other issues of fact have now become immaterial to the disposition of the 
case. It is immaterial to this speech that the second only calls to be considered because of questions 
of causation, a matter explored fully in Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s speech.   
In essence, we must ask whether Dr Horn acted with integrity as a responsible professional. This is a 
two-stage test, examining firstly her personal integrity, and secondly her position as a responsible 
professional. The first stage is often obscured in reported litigation, but is brought into sharp relief 
by this case. For, on the facts of this case, the two questions fall to be resolved by applying very 
different legal tests.  It is clear that Dr Horn could not resist a finding of negligence against her in 
respect of not attending Patrick, because she had in fact decided that it was her professional duty to 
do so. She had told Sister Sallabank that she would attend ‘as soon as possible’ (see [1997] 3 All ER 
771, 773g). There is no issue here about professional standards, expert evidence or the Bolam test. 
The matter concerned her personal integrity. Having exercised her professional judgment, she had 
defined the standard of care that applied to her and she failed to meet it. 
  
No doubt, this occurs in numerous cases that are never reported because it will commonly result in 
an acceptance of liability and the case being settled out of court. Similarly, if a defendant admits 
they are at fault, liability will follow (see Whitehouse v Jordan [1981] 1 All ER 267, 288 per Lord 
Bridge). The matter usually only arises in cases contested in the courts because of disputes about 
what in fact happened. An instructive example is Smith v Tunbridge Wells Health Authority [1994] 5 
Med LR 334. The doctor, Mr Cook, was of the professional opinion that it was necessary to warn the 
young sexually active male patient that there was a risk of impotence from the procedure in 
question. The plaintiff’s experts agreed, but the defendants’ experts did not. Mr Cook believed that 
he would have given the requisite warning, and that if he had not done so, he would have 
considered himself to be in breach of his duty. The Health Authority, for whom Mr Cook worked, 
resisted the claim. It argued that Mr Cook had in fact warned the patient. In the alternative, it 
further contended that if it was found by the court that he had not done so, then this was not 
negligent because there was no legal duty to warn in such circumstances. 
Morland J approached the case as governed by the Bolam test, as elucidated in Sidaway, and found 
that a practice of non-disclosure would have been ‘neither reasonable nor responsible’. With the 
greatest of respect to the judge, this approach was clearly incompatible with the decision of the 
House of Lords in Maynard v West Midlands RHA. The expert evidence showed that there was a 
contemporary school of thought, including a leading textbook, which would not have regarded such 
a warning as necessary. Morland J chose between two schools of thought and, as the House of Lords 
had specifically held, he was not entitled to do so. No doubt, his approach would have been 
criticised on appeal. But there was no appeal, and for good reason. The fact that some doctors might 
have escaped liability in negligence in these circumstances did not mean that Mr Cook could have 
done so. For Mr Cook could not with integrity have asserted that he should not have given the 
warning. On the contrary, his professional judgment was that he should have done so. The law held 
him to the standard of that judgement. In the same way, Dr Horn could not have asserted with any 
integrity that she need not have attended Patrick and it is to her employer’s credit that it did not 
seek to require to her to make any such claim once the court have made its finding on the evidence 
that she had in fact decided to attend.  
We turn, therefore to the second problem. The judge found as a fact that even if she had attended 
Patrick at 1400, as she had intended, Dr Horn would not have arranged for him to be intubated. This 
was her honest opinion and she was fully entitled to assert it without compromising her personal 
integrity. Things would be very different she had been of the view that intubation was appropriate. 
In such circumstances, it would be immaterial that others might have thought differently. To allow 
her to defend the claim on the basis that others might have done differently would be to undermine 
the expectation that society, and the law, has that the professional ethics requires doctors to act 
with integrity. A doctor without integrity has breached the social contract that provides the context 
for the standard of care expected by the law of negligence. 
This is not a novel concept. The law has long been familiar this argument from integrity. It is the 
principle that lies behind the two of the traditional maxims of equity; that ‘he (sic) who comes to 
equity must come with clear hands’ so that equity will not allow someone to take advantage of their 
own wrong, and that equity will not allow a statute to be used as the instrument of fraud. Both 
these maxims show how the law can recognise that an argument can be valid in the abstract, but be 
unavailable to someone in a specific case because of their conduct. The equitable doctrine of 
estoppel is another example of this line of thought; those who indicate that they will not exercise 
their legal rights in such a way as to induce reliance by another are not permitted to renege on that 
representation even though the legal right remains fundamentally sound 
This point has rarely been articulated in the medical cases, but its presence nevertheless be traced. 
In the recent case of Re T [1997] 1 All ER 193 the Court of Appeal took the unusual step of endorsing 
a mother’s decision that a liver transplant was not in her son’s best interests despite the clinical 
team’s assertion that it was. Amongst the features of the case was the fact that the hospital had 
committed itself to the position that the operation would only be appropriate with the full support 
of a child’s family. The change of position on this point undermined their claim to be making a 
decision with integrity.  
It might be suggested that the doctrine was rejected when the court permitted Diane Blood to take 
advantage of the legal wrong of taking sperm without consent or justification from her dying 
husband (R v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, ex p Blood [1997] 2 All ER 687). 
However, this was not a case of a professional seeking to take advantage of their unethical 
behaviour, but a lay person experiencing a personal tragedy. The law’s expectation of moral integrity 
from professionals did not therefore extend to her. Thus, the contrast of approach to these two 
cases serves to demonstrate the law’s expectations of the personal integrity of health professionals 
in return for its respect for clinical judgment. 
If that were the end of the story, then the Health Authority would not be vicariously liable for 
Patrick’s death. However, we must go on then to consider whether Dr Horn’s professional integrity 
permits to rely on her (admittedly speculative) judgment that intubation was unnecessary. This is 
where the Bolam test falls to be considered. We must consider whether the judgements that she 
made were professionally acceptable in the sense that a responsible body of opinion would have 
regarded them as proper. For a professional cannot, with integrity, claim respect for a specific 
clinical judgment that would not be supported by her colleagues. That would be closer to an 
immunity from suit than the promotion of clinical freedom in the wider interests of patient. 
The case law demonstrates consideration of a number of ways in which expert opinion and practice 
may fall short of the requirement of integrity. Space permits only a brief illustrative summary, and it 
is certainly not exhaustive. On the issue of expert evidence, it may be that such evidence is 
influenced by ‘the exigencies of litigation’, in which case it would become ‘self-defeating’ as no 
professional could present it, or seek to rely on it, with integrity (see Lord Wilberforce in Whitehouse 
v Jordan [1981] 1 All ER 267, 276). Lord Bridge developed this theme most eloquently, saying that 
interpreting a defence witness’ report as the trial judge had done implied that it was ‘a dishonest 
attempt to whitewash a subordinate’ and would reveal the author as a ‘not only a knave but also a 
fool’ [1981] 1 All ER 267, 287. This was not the case and the judge’s finding could not stand. If such a 
lack of integrity had been displayed, the court would have been amply justified in disregarding the 
evidence, however eminent the witness.  
Nevertheless, this is a risk that may be as much the fault of lawyers as the medical profession and it 
would be tragic if the moral integrity of medicine was degraded by its contact with the less altruistic 
values of the legal profession. In the Court of Appeal in Whitehouse v Jordan, Lord Denning MR had 
drawn attention to the pernicious tendency of lawyers to undermine the integrity of medical experts 
by ‘settling’ their evidence so as to bias it towards their client’s care – ‘A striking instance is the way 
in which Professor Tizard’s report was ‘doctored’. The lawyers blacked out a couple of lines in which 
he agreed with Professor Strang that there was no negligence’ [1980] 1 All ER 650, 655.  
Turning to issues of professional practice, it seems clear that no doctor could rely on fear of litigation 
as an excuse for an unnecessary test that caused the patient harm or for being so risk-averse as to 
avoid modern treatment (a position described as ‘defensive medicine with a vengeance’ by Lord 
Diplock in Sidaway at p 657, see also Lord Scarman in the same case at p 653). That would lack 
professional integrity because it would depart from the ethical orientation to patient welfare.  
These examples show that the court should take care to understand the basis on which health 
professionals assert that a decision was made in the exercise of clinical judgment directed to 
securing the welfare of the patients. It would only be human for professionals to succumb to the 
desire to protect themselves, but if their actions are ‘only human’, rather than ‘professional’ – by 
which we mean taken with integrity in the exercise of professional judgement, then they are not 
entitled to the special respect that professional judgements are due. Judgements that fail to 
‘withstand logical analysis’, as Lord Browne-Wilkinson puts it in his speech, have not been shown by 
defendants to be taken with integrity in this sense.  
However, with respect, I would depart slightly from his formulation in that it is not, in my view, a 
matter of whether a professional opinion is ‘capable of being logically supported’ (emphasis added) 
but whether it has in fact been properly supported. Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s assertion concentrates 
on the logic of the argument, but the issue is the integrity of the professional. Not all logical 
arguments can be asserted with integrity, as has already been noted. By concentrating on the 
evidence of experts, rather than the case made by the defendant, Lord Browne-Wilkinson removes 
the spotlight from the doctor.  
Nevertheless, in the case before us, this subtle difference in immaterial. The evidence shows that Dr 
Horn could properly say with personal integrity that she would not have intubated. She could also 
assert her professional integrity in this decision by showing that her genuine judgment would have 
been within the range of decisions that might properly have been made. There will be circumstances 
in which a decision supported by experts would be acceptable if taken by them, but negligent on the 
part of a particular defendant whose integrity commits them to a different view (see Smith v 
Tunbridge Wells HA, above) or whose reason for reaching a judgment was based on extraneous 
factors (such as protecting themselves rather than the patient, see the dicta in Sidaway). However, 
this is not such a case. 
In conclusion, therefore, it can be seen that the plaintiff cannot show that the failure to intubate 
Patrick Bolitho was negligent. It did not exceed the scope of professional judgment. Nor has it been 
shown that Dr Horn, the professional in question, failed to act with integrity. Along with Lord Slynn 
of Hadley, Nolan, Hoffman and Clyde, I agree, therefore with Lord Browne Wilkinson that the appeal 
should be dismissed. I have added this lengthy alternative only because it may be in subsequent 
cases that the differences between approaches that we have taken will be significant. 
 
 
